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Abstract
Lakatos’s methodology of scientific research programmes centres around series of theo-
ries, with little regard to the role of models in theory construction. Modifying it to incor-
porate model-groups, clusters of developmental models that are intended to become new
theories, provides a description of the model dynamics within the search for physics beyond
the standard model. At the moment, there is no evidence for BSM physics, despite a con-
certed search effort especially focused around the standard model account of electroweak
symmetry breaking (also known as the Higgs mechanism). Using the framework provided
by Lakatosian research programmes, we can capture the way the periphery of a model-group
changes as the available parameter space shrinks, while its central tenets remain untouched
by unfavourable experimental findings. By way of motivation, I provide two case studies of
model-groups that offer alternative mechanisms for electroweak symmetry breaking: super-
symmetry and composite-Higgs models. Both of these model-groups are under pressure from
the discovery of the Higgs boson, yet they have both been active research projects in the
years after the Higgs discovery. However, a proper assessment of the progress of an ongoing
research programme is impossible through a purely Lakatosian lens, so I propose replacing it
with Laudan’s problem-solving account, which provides ongoing assessment, while offering
normative guidance concerning the pursuit-worthiness of research programmes. My incorpo-
ration of model-groups into Lakatosian research programmes captures the developments of
two attempts to expand our physical description of the world, and Laudan’s problem-solving
rationality allows us to assess their pursuit-worthiness.
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1 Introduction
The standard model (SM) of particle physics is one of our best tested and confirmed theories.
However, the SM has well-documented problems (including the hierarchy problem and a lack
of explanation for dark matter, gravity, neutrino masses, or matter-antimatter asymmetry) and
physicists hope that probing the electroweak symmetry breaking (EWSB) sector at the Large
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Hadron Collider (LHC) may provide clues for resolving some of them. Alternative mechanisms
of EWSB going beyond the SM (BSM) were introduced long before a particle closely matching
the properties of the SM Higgs boson was discovered in July 2012. The SM account of EWSB,
the Brout-Englert-Higgs mechanism that describes the spontaneous breaking of the SU(2) gauge
symmetry resulting in the masses of weak force bosons and other fundamental particles,1 was
accompanied by worries over naturalness and fine-tuning,2 and introduced a fundamental scalar
field unlike anything else described by particle physics.3 These worries over the perceived faults
of the SM account have driven BSM model-building. Even as the new particle’s properties were
better determined and a consensus reached that it is indeed a Higgs boson (with a shrinking
parameter space for anything besides the SM account), alternative understandings of EWSB
are still common, with work from several varieties of BSM models still regularly appearing in
publication and the online preprint archive, arXiv.org (see Chall et al., 2019). Though many
EWSB models haven’t received direct empirical support from data collected at the LHC, they
haven’t been entirely excluded either. Work on these models continues, despite a lack of evidence.
But the question remains: with a well-established competitor and growing reasons to doubt, how
are physicists able to continue pursuing these alternative models? I will argue that a suitably
modified reading of Lakatosian research programmes provides a description of this persistence, as
well as points towards norms for pursuit-worthiness. In order to demonstrate my modifications
in action, I will provide case studies composed of the strategies employed by supersymmetry
(SUSY) and composite Higgs (CH) models during the Higgs discovery.
First, I will give a brief overview of Lakatos’s methodology of scientific research programmes
(MSRP). My argument requires two modifications of the MSRP, in order to better suit the cur-
rent philosophical treatment of scientific models and their use in contemporary particle physics.
The first modification, the introduction of the concept of a ‘model-group’, will allow the BSM
alternatives to be given a full Lakatosian analysis. Next, I will provide two in-depth case studies,
focusing on the years around the Higgs discovery, where I will show model-groups acting as re-
search programmes, preserving their hard cores. By analysing the conceptual moves made within
these model-groups during an episode of unfavourable empirical discovery, I hope to motivate
both the need for, and the power of, the framework of research programmes in capturing the
model dynamics of particle physics. However, as we will see, Lakatos’s views on the rational
analysis scientific practice is problematic. In the final part of this article, I will provide my sec-
ond modification, a solution to the lack of judgement on the progressiveness of ongoing research
programmes borrowing from Larry Laudan’s (1977) notion of progress through problem-solving.
With these two modifications, I believe I can apply the notion of scientific research programmes in
analysing the pursuit-worthiness of theorizing that extends beyond our ability to experimentally
test.
2 Research Programmes
2.1 The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes
Lakatos’s (1978a) MSRP is meant to rationally reconstruct the history of science and show the
growth of knowledge. A research programme consists of a series of overlapping theories, with
1As originally described by Englert and Brout (1964); Higgs (1964a,b); Guralnik et al. (1964).
2The naturalness problem is roughly understood as the large, surprising, and unexplained difference in scale
between important parameters in the SM. Fine-tuning in physics is a measure of the precision of adjustments
made to various parameters of a model to accommodate experimental observations.
3See (Friederich et al., 2014) for an overview of the worries with the SM Higgs mechanism and (Wells, 2018)
for an argument that the Higgs boson is an “immoderate speculation.”
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new theories rising to replace theories discarded due to problematic experimental results and
theoretical critiques. The changes in response to challenges occur within the “protective belt”
of the research programme, those theories, models, auxiliary hypotheses, and other elements
that can be considered disposable. The specific bounds of possible changes are described in the
programme’s “positive heuristic,” which details how the protective belt adjusts to problems. The
positive heuristic also describes potential avenues for future development of the programme.
Conversely, the central tenets of the programme form its “hard core” and are insulated
from critique. Once it is established, the hard core is protected by the programme’s “negative
heuristic,” which mandates that the hard core cannot be challenged by experimental results:
“The negative heuristic of the programme forbids us to direct the modus tollens at this ‘hard
core’. Instead, we must use our ingenuity to articulate or even invent ‘auxiliary hypotheses’,
which form a protective belt around this core, and we must redirect the modus tollens to these”
(48). Lakatos did not clearly describe what sorts of elements make up a programme’s hard
core. His examples ranged from physical laws (the hard core of Newtonian physics, for example,
consists of “the three laws of mechanics and the law of gravitation” (4)), to postulates (Lakatos
describes the hard core of Bohr’s research programme of light emission as consisting of five
postulates, some of which encompass laws, but none of which are identical to laws (55–56)),
to generalised conjectures (The hard core of the Proutian programme is stated as “the atomic
weights of pure chemical elements are whole numbers” (Lakatos, 1978b, 118)). One thing that is
apparent, however, is that the hard core makes ontological commitments required of the theories
composing it.
A research programme is not determined to be ‘true’ or ‘confirmed’ or ‘acceptable’: rather,
it is judged ‘progressive’ or ‘degenerative’. A programme is progressive if “its theoretical growth
anticipates its empirical growth, that is as long as it keeps predicting novel facts with some
success” (Lakatos, 1978b, 112). A programme is degenerative if empirical progress outpaces its
theoretical growth, leading to post hoc accommodations rather than predictions. A single nega-
tive experimental result is not sufficient to determine that a research programme is degenerative,
since Lakatos explicitly rejects the notion of a crucial experiment, except when seen with hind-
sight. For Lakatos, an experiment can only be seen as crucial once it is clear that there will
be no recovery from the disconfirming empirical evidence. This slow process allows a research
programme to go through periods where it makes no progress and/or accumulates anomalies.
But it is not irrational to continue working on such a programme, since there is always the possi-
bility that it will surpass its rivals in progressiveness in the future. Thus, the proper assessment
of research programmes involves rivals operating simultaneously, requiring some form of score-
keeping to track their progressiveness, while demanding humility and patience, since seemingly
incontrovertible experimental findings can be overturned. The requirement Lakatos imposes for
analysing progressiveness with hindsight will be explored in more detail in Section 4.
As noted above, Lakatos’s MSRP emphasised (series of) theories as the unit of analysis,
placing models firmly in the protective belt. For Lakatos, a model is a simulation of reality
with “a set of initial conditions (possibly together with some of the observational theories) which
one knows is bound to be replaced during the further development of the programme, and one
even knows, more or less, how” (Lakatos, 1978a, 51). However, this view of models is outdated,
and doesn’t match the practice of model-building in particle physics.4 I will now address these
modelling deficiencies.
4There are other aspects of the MSRP that might cause one to be ‘Lakatos intolerant.’ One of these will be
explored in more detail later, with mention of additional worries over Lakatos’s project.
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2.2 Theories vs. Models
Using recent discussions in philosophy, supplemented by the common practices of particle physi-
cists, I will establish a rough distinction between theories and at least some models. This
distinction opens the door for my proposed modification of the framework of Lakatosian research
programmes, which will admits a better understanding of the model dynamics of EWSB.
A great deal of recent discussion about models has concerned the autonomy they have from
both theory and experiment.Morgan and Morrison (1999) argue that both the construction and
function of models leads to a degree of independence from theory and data. In addition to this
autonomy, Hartmann (1995) provides a taxonomy of models within what he calls the “Diachronic
View,” which covers dynamic elements of science such as theory construction. These two view-
points illustrate the dual purposes of this section: establishing some distinction between theory
and model; and motivating the function of models within theory construction.5
There are cases where models cannot function if they are too dependent on theory, such
as when the theory itself is too complex and only a simplified model allows explanations or
predictions to be extracted from it. Hartmann calls these “models as substitute for a theory”.
Some models are constructed solely from a theoretical core and were never intended to match
experimental results. They can still teach us valuable things about the phenomenology of the
target system or the theoretical ecosystem, however, so Hartmann also emphasises the role of
these “toy models” in theory construction. Finally, there are models used in cases where there
are no theories at all, like what we see in BSM physics, where some models are frequently treated
as preliminary theories (SUSY, for example, is sometimes described as a theory) or extensions of
larger theories (BSM models in general extend beyond the more empirically-grounded elements
of more general quantum field theories), though this situation occurs wherever there is no over-
arching theory available. Hartmann refers to these as “developmental models”, and argues that
they play a critical role in theory construction. This last class of models will be crucial in my
first modification of the MSRP, since it is so prominent in BSM searches.
Since I am modifying the MSRP to accept collections of models, in addition to series of
theories, something needs to be said about what distinguishes models from theories in the first
place. However, distinguishing models from theories is troublesome, since they commonly share
many of the same features and functions. Therefore (and because there is such a wide variety
of things referred to as models), my distinction will be limited in scope to particle physics and
possess a somewhat flexible boundary. I don’t find this limitation problematic, since my goal is
merely to expand the understanding of research programmes to accommodate additional elements
that are already related to theories.
Consider the SM itself, which (as its name implies) started out as a model. The current
consensus is that it has become a theory in its own right.6 The distinction between model and
theory that Morgan and Morrison introduce is “rough and ready” and cannot possibly apply to
all models, but it approximates what occurred with the SM and aligns nicely with Hartmann’s
description of developmental models. They distinguish models as “account[s] of a process that is
less certain or incomplete in important respects” while a theory “account[s] for more phenomena
and has survived extensive testing” (Morgan and Morrison, 1999, 18). On this reading, the SM
is a theory, since it accounts for a wide swath of physical phenomena and has survived decades of
empirical testing. The various BSM alternatives we will discuss later count as models, since they
lack empirical support. But, because they aim to go beyond the bounds of our present theories
by describing phenomena that no proper theory does, they are specifically developmental models.
5For more on incorporating BSM models into the Models as Mediators approach, including Hartmann’s (1999)
discussion of narratives, see (Sto¨ltzner, 2014).
6Iliopoulos (2014) has suggested, for instance, that the SM is now complete and should be referred to as “The
Standard Theory.”
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It is easy to see why this distinction cannot apply to all models. Some models are designed to
approximate a specific phenomenon described by a theory, some are meant to simplify a complex
theory so that empirical consequences can be derived, some are pedagogical, and so on. There are
many roles models play that prevent them from being considered developmental models.However,
since developmental models have the potential to become full-fledged theories, the “rough and
ready” distinction made by Morgan and Morrison applies to them. For our purposes, this is
distinction enough to carve out new space in the Lakatosian MSRP: things that are not (yet)
theories, but are still treated like scientific research programmes.
2.3 Model-Groups
Various BSM strategies have been developed, leading to numerous models. Generally, these
models introduce additional content to the SM, covering a wider range of phenomena. Under
our distinction between developmental models and theory, these BSM strategies are classified
as models, since they lack empirical support necessary to reach theory-hood. We can classify
many individual models as members of larger groups based on their commonalities, since they
are constructed using a small number of common concepts, ontologies, or methodologies.
This natural grouping of models combines the way particle physicists typically organise these
models with the framework of Lakatosian research programmes. By seeing the central tenets
of these models as the hard cores of research programmes, we can introduce a new concept:
the model-group.A model-group is composed of developmental models (along with conceptual
techniques and mathematical tools) intended to explore and test a pre-theoretic hard core. I
claim that model-groups function as research programmes. Only minor adjustments are required
to the Lakatosian framework to accommodate them.
Let us flesh out the idea of model-groups as research programmes. The hard core of the model-
group guides the construction of its individual members,7 each demonstrating various strategies
for exploring the group’s parameter space, making predictions, and describing phenomena. In-
dividual models are created with the conceptual strategies and methodological tools that have
been incorporated into the model-building strategies of the group’s positive heuristic. These
strategies determine how the model-group will adapt to empirical and theoretical challenges.
The individual models then form the protective belt of the model-group. It is the individual
models that are falsified if they cannot match the data, while the hard core survives to generate
new models. Individual models have the potential to increase the programme’s empirical content
because they make novel predictions that are subject to testing.
The individual models in the protective belt retain the ontological assertions of the hard
core (for example, the compositeness of the Higgs particle, or the symmetry between bosons
and fermions of SUSY) while differing from one another in other ways. Typically, a model will
have parameters in its Lagrangian adjusted differently than others; setting different mass values
for a predicted particle, for instance. Different models from the same group may posit different
energy ranges for symmetry breaking, or one may include new particles to remain mathematically
consistent, while another doesn’t need them. The variability between models within a single
group have two primary constraints: the hard core and the remaining parameter space available.
The hard core constrains individual models exactly as you would expect: certain features must
be present in each member of the model-group because they are constructed using the elements
of the hard core. The parameter space itself is constrained by both theoretical considerations
and experimental findings. Models must operate within the bounds of the parameter space as
it is defined by the best experimental evidence available. Thus, if a model describes phenomena
7Borrelli (2012) offers a precursor to this idea, using the concept of “theoretical core” introduced by Morrison
(2007).
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT at EUROPEAN JOURNAL FOR PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT at EUROPEAN JOURNAL FOR PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
within a portion of the parameter space that has been excluded by experiment, then the model
must be discarded or reworked, since those parameters are no longer considered viable (though
caveats exist: for example, there must be a consensus that the experimental data is trustworthy).
The hard cores themselves can be non-specific, describing general ontological features but
leaving the specifics for the individual models to fill in. It is unlikely that the entire parameter
space for any of these BSM model-groups will be completely eliminated (they all extend to
energy ranges beyond what is currently testable using existing accelerators), there is always the
possibility that some new test will vindicate the programme. However, this insulation from
experimental exclusion is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it provides the research
programme with stability, preventing the core ideas from being discarded with every unfavourable
result. Physicists can continue their attempts to solve the problems with the SM without having
to start from scratch with every failed prediction. On the other hand, it can lead to dead ends
and charges of artificiality: in other words, to degeneration. Some corners of the parameter
space are seen as much more promising than others, or more in keeping with various pragmatic
considerations (they are directly testable or are more natural, for instance). When these segments
are steadily eliminated by negative experimental results, the creation of models to probe less
promising avenues will seem increasingly ad hoc. Once the entire energy range open to the
LHC has been probed, there will be nowhere else to look until new accelerators are built, a
complicated, time-consuming, and increasingly expensive prospect. It may still be rational to
pursue research programmes whose parameter spaces have become increasingly marginalised, but
we must honestly assess their virtues and label them degenerative when appropriate. More will
be said on the possibility for normative guidance in cases such as these in Section 4.
One thing to note is that the diversity of model-groups is encouraged in the MSRP. A variety
of rival programmes follows directly from the difficulty in concretely eliminating a programme,
leading to long intervals where many programmes compete over the same range of phenomena.
Indeed, Lakatos says that “[t]he history of science has been and should be a history of competing
research programmes” and that “the sooner competition starts, the better for progress” (Lakatos,
1978a, 69, my emphasis).8 Therefore, the number of competing BSM model-groups meshes quite
well with them behaving as research programmes.
There is a certain amount of permeability between model-groups, which is a necessary con-
sequence of the fact that physicists don’t work exclusively within the boundaries of a single
model-group: cross-pollination is bound to occur as physicists move between BSM projects, col-
laborate with colleagues, or peruse the preprint arXiv for novel ways to further their work. For
instance, you can find composite Higgs models that also contain extra dimensions (and thus
blend two quite different strategies to account for EWSB). Supersymmetric variations of every
other BSM model-group are common. Cross-pollination can occur even when aspects of the two
research programmes are inconsistent, as long as those inconsistencies have at least the appear-
ance that they can be resolved.9 Lakatos explains this behaviour in the context of two rival
programmes: since eliminating a rival is a long process, it becomes rational to pursue both, if
possible, allowing scientists to further develop a less-favoured rival programme “in order to show
up its weakness” (Lakatos, 1978b, 112). We can also explain this willingness to work in multiple
programmes by appealing to physicists’ agnosticism towards any model or theory without ade-
8Lakatos is not explicit about why competition is better for progress. From the context, it likely stems from
the way programmes are assessed: since programmes are only assessed in hindsight, competition increases the
likelihood that some programme will be increasing its “heuristic power” during any particular timespan. Lakatos
also remarks that without a rival, a scientist may feel a “hypersensitivity to anomalies and a feeling of a Kuhnian
‘crisis’ ” (68). Of course, one could also see a sort of evolutionary account of competition, like that described by,
for example, van Fraassen (1980).
9Lakatos describes how whole research programmes can be “grafted on to older programmes with which they
are blatantly inconsistent” (Lakatos, 1978a, 56), a process he referred to as ‘competitive symbiosis.’
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quate supporting data. Naturally, physicists who work within multiple model-groups will bring
helpful conceptual tools and phenomenological features to each. What is important to note with
this cross-pollination, is that elements taken from rival programmes are incorporated into the
protective belt, not the hard core, limiting the degree of theoretical overlap.
As I have shown, only a small adjustment is necessary to incorporate model-groups into the
MSRP. We need merely to add to Lakatos’s framework our expanded account of scientific models.
Once the wider features and functions of models are accessible to the MSRP, model-groups can be
accommodated as research programmes by focusing on the role they play in theory development.
They function analogously to research programmes composed of series of theories. In the next
section, we will explore two examples of model-groups as they appear in particle physics.
3 Particle Physics Model-Groups: Two Case Studies
Articles discussing the merits of composite Higgs and supersymmetric models are still very com-
mon in the physics literature. However, both model-groups are experiencing pressures, largely
due to the discovery of a particle that matches SM predictions for a Higgs boson and the com-
plete absence of new, non-SM particles. This situation raises the question of why these models
persist in the face of unfavourable empirical data. The case studies I present will show that our
Lakatosian framework offers the best description of this phenomenon.
According to Lakatos, there are three ways to resolve problems that arise for a research
programme:
[B]y solving it within the original programme (the anomaly turns into an example);
by neutralizing it, i.e. solving it within an independent, different programme (the
anomaly disappears); or, finally, by solving it within a rival programme (the anomaly
turns into a counterexample) (Lakatos, 1978a, 72).
An adjustment made to a programme to resolve a problem is known as a problem-shift. In what
follows, I will provide a quick overview of the landscape of models for electro-weak symmetry
breaking. The CH and SUSY model-groups will receive a more thorough treatment, including a
review of the problems that arose with the Higgs discovery and the problem-shifts these research
programmes underwent to protect their hard cores.
3.1 The EWSB Landscape
Using recent work examining the landscape of models in the EWSB sector during the Higgs
boson discovery (see, e.g., Borrelli and Sto¨ltzner, 2013; Sto¨ltzner, 2014; Chall et al., 2019), we
can distinguish the primary model-groups within the EWSB sector: supersymmetry, non-SUSY
Extended Higgs models, composite Higgs models, and Extra-Dimensional models.10These four
model-groups do not exhaust the BSM EWSB alternatives, but they comprise the bulk of current
SM alternatives. Only a cursory look at the non-SUSY extended Higgs and extra-dimensional
model-groups will be provided here.
10A technique that has become popular within the physics literature is operator product expansions (OPEs) in
the framework of SM effective field theories (SMEFTs). This technique is often referred to as a model-independent
search strategy, which raises the question of whether SMEFT/OPEs are a model-group (or otherwise count as
a research programme), or if they belong in some other category. There are consistent methods within this
approach, and models of some kind are still produced (see, e.g., Dawson, 2017). I don’t include SMEFT/OPEs
here, since the technique is more of a broad mathematical searching strategy, without an easily discernible hard
core, suggesting that the technique is a search strategy to generate new research programmes, rather than a
single programme in its own right. Determining whether it can properly be classified as a Lakatosian research
programme is beyond the scope of the current discussion.
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The standard model itself remains the dominant research programme in particle physics, so
a brief understanding of its features is presented here. The hard core of the SM, at least as far
as the EWSB sector is concerned, is that there is a universal scalar field (the Higgs field) that
causes spontaneous breaking of the symmetry of the electroweak force by condensing below a
certain energy scale. Before symmetry breaking, all elementary particles are massless, but below
a certain temperature three of the field’s degrees of freedom are “eaten” by the particle carriers of
the weak force, thus generating the masses of the W and Z bosons. The fourth degree of freedom
becomes the Higgs boson, and other elementary fermions gain mass through a different type of
interaction with the Higgs field. This process is the simplest method described for electroweak
symmetry breaking. The SM could not provide a firm prediction of the mass of the Higgs
boson, the particle associated with this field. However, the particle’s other properties depend
on its mass, so the protective belt consisted of the values of the dependent properties, exactly
calculated for each possible mass value of the Higgs. Now that physicists have found a particle
matching Higgs predictions at 125 GeV, the protective belt consists of a detailed accounting of
its properties and predictions of features that require higher precisions testing. The limits of
LHC experimental sensitivity, then, determine the prospects for discovering new physics.
The BSM model-groups incorporate all or most of the experimentally accessible SM into
their hard cores. The EWSB sector is where the biggest divergence between the SM and BSM
models can be found at lower energy scales, with all BSM model-groups discussed here intro-
ducing significant changes to the SM Brout-Englert-Higgs mechanism. Each model-group acts
as an extension to the SM, largely adding its own features to the SM Lagrangian or otherwise
accounting for non-SM effects. This connection to the SM follows from the need for each BSM
model to recover (or otherwise accommodate) the experimental results at lower energies, which
accord with the SM. Lakatos states that a fledgling research programme can incorporate pieces
of a well-established rival, even if those pieces are later found to be inconsistent with the new re-
search programme.This process is necessary, since the established programme already has access
to theoretical and empirical resources, resources the new programme will need in order to attract
researchers. Since all the model-groups I consider here share this feature, I will omit mention of
SM elements of their hard cores and protective belts, focusing solely on their BSM elements.
The non-SUSY extended Higgs sector adds additional Higgs multiplets (usually in the form
of two-Higgs-doublet or triplet models) to the SM’s sole doublet (which describes its degrees of
freedom). These models handle EWSB similarly to SUSY models, adding more Higgs particles,
but are significantly different because they don’t double the number of SM particles. The hard
core of the extended Higgs sector consists of the extension of the SM to increase the number of
Higgs doublets, in order to preserve certain theoretical constraints, like naturalness, and provide
an explanation for the asymmetry between matter and antimatter.Its protective belt consists of
various models that adjust the parameters of the different multiplets, indicating where to find
new physical scalars and deviations in the properties of the boson discovered in 2012.
Extra-dimensional models explain EWSB through boundary conditions that lead to broken
symmetries at higher dimensions (see, e.g., Csaki et al., 2004). A consequence of this method of
EWSB is that there is generally no Higgs predicted, fundamental or composite. The protective
belt thus includes various models accounting for the boson discovered in 2012, with claims that
it is not actually a boson associated with EWSB. These individual models also describe how
the extra dimensions can be probed and the specifics of how the boundary conditions break
electroweak symmetry. The upshot of this model-group is that there is no need to introduce a
fundamental scalar particle and there is a solution to the naturalness problem, a hallmark of
most BSM models.
This quick overview of the EWSB sector shows the wide variety of research programmes at
play in particle physics. What follows is a deeper examination of the CH and SUSY model-
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT at EUROPEAN JOURNAL FOR PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT at EUROPEAN JOURNAL FOR PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
groups. The CH model-group is situated roughly in the middle of the complexity of particle
physics model-groups. It lacks the widespread appeal that SUSY enjoys, but has a longer history
than the groups mentioned above. SUSY is the most prominent programme in BSM physics,
and some physicists refer to it as a theory in its own right. Both of these model-groups have long
histories that include numerous evolutions, but I will restrict my examination (beyond a brief
historical sketch of each) to the timespan of the Higgs boson discovery.
3.2 The Composite Higgs
The composite Higgs model-group is a broad class of models that introduces the existence of a
strong interaction at a high energy, which leads to strong EWSB. The group originated from the
search for the mass generation of W and Z bosons, much as the SM did, using a framework bor-
rowed from superconductivity. Composite particles arise from a dynamically broken symmetry,
as opposed to the spontaneous symmetry breaking appearing in the SM. The first examples of
dynamical EWSB were intended to demonstrate alternatives to spontaneous symmetry breaking
(Jakciw and Johnson, 1973; Cornwall and Norton, 1973).11 A composite particle of EWSB is
first mentioned by Goldman and Vinciarelli (1974), though it was soon expanded by Susskind
and Dimopoulos,12 who borrowed from the “color” theory of the strong nuclear force, leading to
the first Technicolor (TC) models. TC models introduced a local gauge symmetry representing a
new interaction at the TeV scale. The gauge bosons acquire mass by coupling to Technihadrons,
including a scalar that could serve as a Higgs impostor.13
Susskind’s popularisation of the idea of dynamic symmetry breaking leading to a composite
scalar boson of EWSB sparked many model-building efforts. Mass generation by a composite
system attracted lots of attention, since it avoided the ‘immoderate speculation’ of an elementary
scalar boson arising from EWSB. This explanation also provided a potential solution to the
naturalness problem, since the addition of a compositeness scale, f , creates some wiggle room
to avoid fine-tuning certain parameters. Some variations offered dark matter candidates by
predicting new, undiscovered particles.
By the 1980s came the introduction of the notion of dynamical breaking of a global symmetry
including a new strong interaction. Models using this notion could accommodate a light (pseudo)
Nambu-Goldstone boson (pNGB), generating the Higgs potential through radiative corrections.
Since then, multiple variations have emerged, including varying iterations upon the TC theme
(Extended TC, Walking TC, Topcolor, etc.) and the ‘Little Higgs’ (LH) models (which allowed
for large, non-derivative interactions, particularly the Higgs quartic interaction (see, e.g., Arkani-
Hamed et al., 2002)).This history provide a host of examples of the CH research programme
protective belt undergoing problem-shifts in response to empirical and theoretical pressures, but
I will restrict my case study to the Higgs discovery. With its long history, its explanation of
EWSB without elementary scalars, and its ability to solve perceived problems of the SM, it is
easy to see why the CH model-group has interested many physicists.
Turning from the brief historical overview to our Lakatosian analysis, the hard core of the CH
model-group can be summarised as ‘EWSB is attributable to a strong dynamical process caused
by new gauge interactions at high energy scales, so that the particle associated with EWSB (if
any) is a composite, rather than a fundamental, scalar.’ The positive heuristic provides the
11Indeed: “It will be evident that this model is not intended as a realistic theory of weak or electromagnetic
interactions. Rather,it is only an example of what we feel is probably a large class of theories in which the
spontaneous symmetry breaking derives from general features of an apparently symmetric interaction” (Cornwall
and Norton, 1973, 3338).
12See (Susskind, 1979; Dimopoulos and Susskind, 1979).
13It should be noted that some TC models are able to account for EWSB dynamically and without a resulting
scalar, and are thus considered ‘Higgsless.’
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various model-building strategies that create the protective belt, including new strategies and
techniques to sustain model-building against anticipated empirical and conceptual challenges.
The protective belt is made up of various models describing the properties of the new gauge
interactions and any physics associated with them, including the parameters of any composite
scalars and other particles associated with new strong interaction scales.
3.2.1 CH Problem-Shifts
The discovery of the Higgs boson created numerous problems for the CH model-group. First,
as the search progressed, the upper limit for the possible mass of the new particle became lower
than many CH models comfortably predicted. Second, the discovery of any Higgs candidate
put immense pressure on Higgsless TC models. Third, its branching ratios, couplings, and
flavour measurements very closely conformed (within LHC precision) to SM predictions. Since
the SM Higgs is a fundamental scalar, these results were taken as evidence that it was not a
composite particle. Finally, no other new particles have been yet been discovered at the LHC.
Each of these problems needs to be addressed to prevent the Higgs discovery from becoming a
significant counterexample to the CH model-group. Too many counterexamples and no expansion
of empirical content would suggest the CH model-group is degenerative, and the SM remains an
empirically successful (albeit flawed) rival.
Let’s first consider the mass. In TC, the vacuum expectation value, v, approximates the com-
positeness scale, f , implying the mass of the Technipion is large, and therefore requires significant
adjustments to accommodate a Higgs as light as pre-LHC experiments were indicating. Despite
the name, Little Higgs models also predicted a mass that was too high without suppressing the
quartic coupling, so these models were already disfavoured by the time of the 2012 discovery
announcement. After it was announced in December 2011 that there was an excess of 125 GeV
in some detector channels, there was an increased urgency in the efforts to accommodate a light
Higgs within CH models.14
With the discovery of a 125 GeV Higgs candidate announced that following July, a large
portion of the CH model-group’s parameter space was excluded, since the mass was too low for
many CH models to accommodate. There were two obvious ways forward: first, the boson still
needed to be checked for signs that it was a Higgs imposter; and second, model-building could
focus on the remaining parameter space supporting a low-mass composite Higgs. Naturally, with
the discovery of a SM Higgs candidate, proponents of all Higgsless models focused on the first
strategy.15 Attempts were made to explain the existence of the boson using Higgsless TC models
by arguing that it arose from a newly posited gauge field (see, e.g., Eichten et al., 2012), though
this strategy became unrealistic as more data arrived.
A close examination of the boson’s couplings and branching ratios was already underway,
with many physicists hoping for an anomaly to indicate the Higgs search wasn’t over. One
initially promising anomaly was the observed relative signal strength in the di-photon channel of
both the ATLAS and CMS detectors, which didn’t align with SM predictions for the Higgs (see,
e.g., Peskin, 2012). Early talk considered the implications of this excess, whether it would reveal
that the boson was not the SM Higgs, or that it wasn’t a particle associated with EWSB at all.
There were efforts to accommodate it within CH models: Chala (2013), for example, used the
excess to create a CH model that introduced new pNGBs that could both explain the excess and
provide a dark matter candidate. With further analysis the excess in the di-photon channel’s
14See, e.g., (Redi and Tesi, 2012) for a discussion of possible light composite Higgs particles following the
announcement.
15In a presentation immediately following the Higgs announcement, Pomarol (2012) displayed a picture of a
tombstone labelled ‘Technicolor Models’ and declared Higgsless models were dead. However, he anticipated the
Higgs-imposter strategy, with the next slide showing a zombie emerging from behind the tombstone.
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signal strength disappeared. Aside from this anomaly, the data demonstrated a remarkable
match with SM predictions: for example, Ellis and You (2012) argued that the new particle did
“indeed walk and quack very much like a Higgs boson,” and as a consequence some of the CH
model-group’s parameter space was excluded. Accordance with the SM has only strengthened
with time, though the limits of LHC precision ultimately underdetermine the particle’s exact
nature.
One interesting solution to multiple problems for the CH model-group appears in the form of
partial compositeness. Unlike TC or LH, partial compositeness is not a type of model but rather
a conceptual and mathematical tool for explaining the origins of fermion masses and flavour
structure, while also accounting for the observed mass hierarchy in particle physics. Originally
introduced in (Kaplan, 1991) as a response to problems with the top in TC, partial compositeness
establishes a new heavy particle for each SM particle, so that each becomes a linear combination
of elementary and composite states. The hierarchy of masses is explained by each generation
having a different degree of compositeness, with the lightest particles being mostly elementary
and the heavier particles being more composite (fermions acquire mass because their composite
sector constituents participate in EWSB, so particles that are more composite in nature are
heavier). Indeed, this hierarchy also helps explain why no SM deviations have been observed,
since the first two (and most precisely measured) generations have lower degrees of compositeness,
suppressing BSM effects (see, e.g., Redi and Weiler, 2011). The flavour structure in models with
partial compositeness does not preclude a fundamental scalar, so adding a new elementary scalar
does not become a fatal empirical problem for the CH model-group, though there is still the
theoretical distaste.
As the possible mass range of the EWSB particle lowered, CH models using partial composite-
ness to explain a light Higgs became more common (see, e.g., Azatov and Galloway, 2012).Since
partial compositeness explained the lightness of the Higgs and the lack of SM deviations, it
is no surprise that its prevalence in the literature expanded rapidly after 2012. Searching the
arXiv for CH entries citing (Kaplan, 1991) reveals that twelve such articles were posted prior to
2012, while more than 120 have appeared since, a ten-fold increase.16 These entries even follow
the Lakatosian tradition of making risky predictions to expand empirical content, as shown in
(Harnik et al., 2017), which provides models with predictions testable at the LHC. If the CH
model-group is to have any hope of being progressive, such phenomenological predictions need
to accompany the theoretical moves made to preserve the programme in the face of problematic
experimental evidence.
3.3 Supersymmetry
Supersymmetry represents a major unconfirmed symmetry of the Poincare´ Group, that of bosons
and fermions. SUSY includes a supersymmetry generator, Q, which mathematically converts
half-integer spin particles (fermions) into integer spin particles (bosons), and vice versa. This
symmetry requires new particles, at least one corresponding to each SM particle.17 Since none
of these ‘superpartners’ retain all the properties of their SM counterparts (for instance, their
masses must be different, or we would have discovered them alongside their SM twins), we know
that SUSY describes a broken symmetry. SUSY has many benefits over the SM: it solves the
16The search was conducted using the search terms: ‘find c Nucl Phys B365 259 and d 1991->2011 and (k
“Higgs model: composite” or k “Higgs particle: composite”)’ and ‘find c Nucl Phys B365 259 and d 2012->2017
and (k “Higgs model: composite” or k “Higgs particle: composite”)’.
17Many CH models also predict heavy partners for SM particles, associated with a new gauge field. The primary
difference between the CH partners and SUSY’s superpartners is that the latter have spins different from their
SM counterparts, while the former have identical spins.
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hierarchy problem by naturally removing the massive fine-tuning from the Planck scale,18 unifies
the gauge couplings at high energies, and some of its superpartners act as dark matter candidates
(see, e.g., Martin, 1997).
Gol’fand and Likhtman (1971) and Volkov and Akulov (1973) independently discovered the
earliest SUSY variations, with a fermionic extension of the Poincare´ Group and an analysis
of neutrinos in 4-dimensions respectively. These early developments included the introduction
of what became known as the superalgebra, which established the commutation relations of
SUSY generators. The renormalization features of a quantum field theory linking fermions and
bosons together were provided in (Wess and Zumino, 1974a,b,c). SUSY was quickly seen as
a serious BSM contender (see, e.g., Fayet and Ferrara, 1977), though it increased the number
of unknown parameters in the SM, since it must be broken at relatively low energies (at least
in natural versions). The most generic extension, first proposed in (Dimopoulos and Georgi,
1981), is the minimal supersymmetric standard model (MSSM), which includes the minimum
number of new parameters necessary to recover SM phenomena. The MSSM has had its own
offshoots, including an even more constrained variation (cMSSM) and a more open version, the
next-to-minimal supersymmetric standard model, NMSSM. One of the most recent extensions,
the phenomenological MSSM (pMSSM), using all the empirical data so far gathered, which act
as constraints on a 19 parameter model.
SUSY EWSB occurs much the same as in the SM, though the Higgs couplings and branching
ratios differ since the additional higher energy particles affect those values. Since an additional
Higgs doublet is needed for consistency, SUSY also predicts additional scalar particles. As
previously mentioned, the Higgs doublet provides four degrees of freedom that produce the
Higgs boson and weak force boson masses. MSSM is a two-Higgs-doublet model, and so predicts
five physical Higgs bosons instead of just one: a light and heavy CP-even (h and H), a CP-odd
(A), and two charged scalar bosons (H±). These extra particles are produced by the extra
four degrees of freedom from the additional Higgs doublet. Other SUSY models may introduce
additional doublets or singlets.
Therefore, the SUSY model-group’s hard core relevant to EWSB can be summarised as
follows: “Spontaneous symmetry breaking leads to the mass generation of both the SM particles
and their SUSY counterparts. Additional scalar bosons, the fermionic Higgsinos, and differences
from the SM Higgs couplings are consequences of the symmetry between fermions and bosons.”
The positive heuristic provides the techniques and tools for adjusting the parameters of the SUSY
particles as experiments rule out certain values. The protective belt is composed of models with
various settings for these parameters, such as the MSSM and its various modifications (cMSSM,
NMSSM, pMSSM, etc.). These models make predictions of the energy ranges in which to find
supersymmetric particles, with the lightest detectable at the LHC, at least in theory.
3.3.1 SUSY Problem-Shifts
Like the CH model-group, proponents of the SUSY model-group understood the problems posed
by the Higgs boson discovery. First, the mass of the newly discovered particle, while still within
the range predicted by the MSSM, was high enough to impose severe constraints.Second, the
boson’s branching ratios and couplings were found to fit quite well with SM expectations, but
not so well with SM-like SUSY. Finally, no superpartners have been discovered, nor have any
18The hierarchy problem, previously mentioned in Section 1, arises because the Higgs boson’s mass is so much
lighter than the Planck mass, which is surprising because it was expected that the Higgs boson mass would
receive quantum contributions from every particle it couples with, making its mass comparable to the scale of
new physics (either the Planck or grand unification scale) without a fine-tuned correction of the order of ∼1030.
Since SUSY provides a symmetry between fermions and bosons, and the quantum contributions to the scalar mass
from superpartners have opposite signs, these contributions cancel and a light Higgs mass matching is expected.
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additional Higgs bosons been found. Once again, a failure to solve these problems should pose a
significant risk to continued trust in SUSY models. As we will see, even if suitable adjustments
can be made, they would undermine one of the underlying motivations for favouring SUSY in
the first place, namely that it solves the hierarchy problem.
More so than with the problems facing the CH model-group, SUSY’s problems are intercon-
nected. For example, the mass of the Higgs proved immediately problematic for the MSSM (see,
e.g., Arbey et al., 2012).The MSSM Lagrangian indicates that the (lightest) Higgs mass would
be
m2h ≈M2Zcos22β + δ2t
where cos22β is related to the ratio of the two Higgs doublets’ vacuum expectation values (tanβ),
MZ is the mass of the Z boson, and δ
2
t is the quantum loop correction from the stops, the top
quark’s superpartners.19 In order to accommodate a mass of 125 GeV, it is necessary for δ2t to
be quite large (just a bit under 90 GeV–near the Z boson’s mass), since all other values (besides
tanβ) are experimentally fixed.
There are two ways to achieve sufficient corrections in MSSM.20 The first is to make the stops
much heavier, since their mass depends exponentially on the mass of the Higgs. To properly
correct for the observed Higgs, the stop mass would need to be at least a few TeV, though such
a high mass reintroduces the sort of hierarchy problem SUSY was meant to solve, since it (along
with the lack of superpartners discovered at the LHC) implies that SUSY particles are much
heavier than the electroweak scale. Such heavy stop masses would suggest that SUSY particles
are out of the accessible range of the LHC. The second way is to have a high degree of stop
mixing.21 Maximal mixing allows the stop masses to be lighter, but requires the quantum loop
correction to be very precisely fine-tuned. This much fine-tuning is seen as quite unnatural given
the remaining parameter space, so this option also has a significant theoretical (and aesthetic)
downside. In either case, the mass of the Higgs boson requires adjustments to the predicted
masses of SUSY particles and the SUSY breaking scale, which in turn, mandates a shift in the
expected Higgs couplings, shifts that have so far not manifested in the data. The overall effect
was to create conceptual problems for the MSSM, since the rationales for adopting it (simplicity,
testability, and ability to neatly solve the hierarchy problem) were undermined.
Many of the other theoretically well-explored SUSY models had to make similar adjustments.
The NMSSM introduces a new singlet field, λ, that couples with the two Higgs doublets of the
MSSM. Since the singlet contributes to the Higgs mass, NMSSM requires fewer adjustments to
accommodate a 125 GeV mass. However, it was apparent even before the July 2012 announce-
ment that there would still be fine-tuning involved, of about 5–10% if the mixing isn’t maximal
(Hall et al., 2012). This fine-tuning requirement severely restricts the NMSSM parameter space.
Similarly, Bechtle et al. (2016) use a frequentist analysis to show that the cMSSM should be
excluded with a 90% confidence level. They base their analysis on available data from particle
accelerators and astrophysics, which they combine with various toy models to obtain a meaning-
ful p value. The reason the remaining parameter space for cMSSM is under so much pressure is
the tension between the model’s prediction of low mass scales for some SUSY particles and the
higher mass scale preferred because of the observed Higgs mass (along with the lack of observa-
tion of SUSY particles at the LHC). In both cases, these well-explored models are not completely
excluded, as both Hall et al. (2012) and Bechtle et al. (2016) acknowledge. However, efforts seem
19I’ve borrowed this formulation from Hall et al. (2012), since their work is used by many commentators
contemporaneous with the Higgs discovery. This prediction arises because the Higgs mass is predominantly
controlled by the mass of A (the pseudoscalar Higgs), tanβ, the stop masses, and the stop mixing parameter, Xt.
20See (Hall et al., 2012) for more details on the following discussion.
21‘Mixing’ refers to the linear combination of two or more mass eigenstates. Here, it refers to the way the stop
couples to other particles, particularly the Higgs.
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to be focusing on more complicated SUSY models because of analyses like these.
4 Progressing on Progressiveness
The brief case studies in the previous section reveal the attempts to solve problems raised by
unfavourable experimental results at the LHC. No new particles or other BSM effects have been
observed since the Higgs boson, despite the 13 TeV upgrade of the LHC and renewed focus on
finding BSM physics. Though the SUSY and CH model-groups have been able to overcome many
of these challenges conceptually, neither has truly expanded their empirical contents.22However,
there is remaining parameter space for both model-groups that is inaccessible to the LHC and
necessitates waiting for the next generation of accelerators, which will have greater energy or
higher precision. In the meantime, the spectre that these model-groups are degenerating research
programmes looms. However, until some historical distance has been achieved, on a strictly
Lakatosian analysis, the Higgs discovery cannot yet be declared a counterexample to either the
SUSY or CH model-groups.
But, as potent a tool for understanding the process of scientific change and knowledge gener-
ation as the MSRP is, even in situations where the empirical data is incomplete, hard to come by,
or unfavourable to the lines of research that draw significant interest, because Lakatos provides
no real mechanism for assessing the progressiveness of an ongoing research programme, its value
in this context is minimal. We are left with a vague feeling that the various BSM model-groups
may be degenerative, without being able to justify this feeling within the MSRP, since we lack
the ability to perform Lakatosian rational reconstruction with sufficient hindsight. This problem
arises from Lakatos’s notion of scientific rationality, from his method of assessing the progres-
siveness of a programme. The inclusion of model-groups into the MSRP offers a potent first step
in providing a rational assessment of physics research that requires significant non-empirical con-
sideration for the foreseeable future. But a more comprehensive understanding, one that doesn’t
rely on waiting to analyse historical cases, requires an account of assessment that addresses the
flaws in Lakatos’s work. This section offers a brief overview of a more significant adjustment to
the MSRP, one that will allow us to make contemporaneous judgements about the amount of
progress a research programme is making, and allow the philosopher of science to employ her
skills in offering normative guidance to scientists.
4.1 The Limits of Lakatosian Assessment
There remain significant problems for the MSRP and its application to BSM model-groups.
Lakatos is insistent that assessments are to be made by philosophers and historians of science
working after the fact, analysing the actions taken by scientists in a historical case. As Hack-
ing’s (1981) reading of the MSRP emphasises, “one can only tell what is progressive and what
degenerative after the event” (132). So Lakatos’s framework is of limited use for advising cur-
rent scientific work because “his philosophy provides no forward-looking assessments of present
competing scientific theories” (133).23
Laudan (1977), a contemporary of Lakatos and fellow methodologist of science, offers several
criticisms. The most relevant for our purposes are that the MSRP has a “conception of progress
22The steps to adapt to the data are different, but this assessment is true for the non-SUSY extended and
extra-dimensions model-groups as well.
23Hacking didn’t take this to be a defect of Lakatos’s methodology, since “[t]here are no significant general
laws about what, in a current bit of research, bodes well for the future. . . only truisms” (134). However, such a
truism may be better at capturing actual scientific practice, and for providing rational norms for scientific decision
making.
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that is exclusively empirical,” cannot provide “recommendations about cognitive action” through
research programme assessments, is unconcerned with the accumulation of anomalies in its as-
sessments, and that research programmes are “rigid in their hard-core structure and admit of
no fundamental changes” (77–78). These problems with the MSRP extend far beyond a failure
to foresee developments in our understanding of models. However, I believe I can answer these
charges by Hacking and Laudan, and in doing so provide a path for a more useful final analysis
of the two case studies presented above, though it will require a much more extreme modifica-
tion to the concept of the Lakatosian research programme than the inclusion of model-groups.
Laudan himself will provide a way of assessing progressiveness that can be applied to ongoing
research programmes, considers theoretical progress, is more cognizant of anomalies, and can
provide recommendations for action.
4.2 Rationality Through Problem-Solving
Like Lakatos before him (whose MSRP acts as a compromise between Popper and Kuhn), Laudan
borrows from his predecessors’ arguments, but also significantly departs from them. Laudan
states that the purpose of scientific theorising is to solve problems. From this perspective,
he introduces a new unit of scientific progress, the research tradition. A research tradition
is characterised by a shared ontology (the phenomena the tradition is concerned with) and a
shared methodology (how the study of those phenomena should be conducted) for its collection
of theories.
Research traditions are assessed through an analysis of how many existing problems are solved
by its theories, and how pressing those problems were. Problems come in two forms: empirical
and conceptual. Empirical problems represent something of the natural world that scientists take
to need explaining, and are solved when a theory provides such an explanation that is found to be
satisfactory within the bounds of the tradition. Conceptual problems are inconsistencies, either
internal to the tradition, or between a theory from the tradition and an external theory that
scientists are unwilling to reject. These problems are solved when the inconsistency is resolved.
Using his problem-solving sense of rationality, Laudan is able to (in principle) say which traditions
should be provisionally accepted: those that have solved the greatest number of problems in their
domain of application. But Laudan can also provide an account of pursuit-worthiness based on
problem-solving effectiveness. Traditions are pursued because they have offered more, and more
significant, recent solutions to problems facing them than competitors, indicating fruitfulness.
This notion of pursuit allows newer traditions to survive in the face of well-established ones. In
an important sense, Laudan’s problem-solving framework flips the usual understanding of the
link between progress and rationality, as he claims that his strategy is the “blurring, and perhaps
the obliteration, of the classical distinction between scientific progress and scientific rationality”
(Laudan, 1977, 5). Since we have a much clearer model of scientific progress than of rationality,
his proposal is that “rationality consists in making the most progressive theory choices,” rather
than defining progress by accepting ever more rational theories (6).
What I suggest is that we incorporate Laudan’s problem-solving account of scientific ra-
tionality into a modified MSRP, replacing Lakatos’s notion of research programme assessment.
There are two reasons I suggest for retaining the framework of research programmes over casting
aside the MSRP and adopting Laudan’s methodology wholesale. First, unlike Lakatosian re-
search programmes, a research tradition’s core elements (its shared ontology and methodology)
are malleable over time. This malleability raises the question of how a research tradition can
retain its identity over time, if these elements central to its identity don’t necessarily remain
consistent. His solution is that there is a relative similarity over time, preserved by a shared,
continuous history that grounds a research tradition’s identity over time, along with a claim that
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“at any given time certain elements of a research tradition are more central to, more entrenched
within, the research tradition than other elements” and it is these that are “unrejectable” 99.
However, the members of the set of unrejectable elements will change over time, and Laudan
barely gestures towards a solution to this shifting of the dilemma. Research programmes, on the
other hand, retain their hard cores once they are established, providing them with a continuous
identity over time that is easier to mark the boundaries of and trace through the available texts
outlining the problem-solving activities of a programme. Since the aim of the hybrid framework
I am proposing is to assess the problem-solving effectiveness of a particular scientific project, the
stability provided by research programmes is virtue rather than a vice.
The second reason is that Laudan characterises research traditions such that they operate at
a very high level of scope and generality. In the case of particle physics, for instance, it is unclear
whether we would have more than one research tradition, the SM, with the BSM models acting
as attempted solutions for its problems. For some purposes, that level of generality is fine for
understanding the progress of this particular domain of physics. However, research programmes,
based on Lakatos’s examples, can operate much more easily on different levels of scope, including
at a rather fine-grained level. Therefore, research programmes are the better conceptual frame-
work for capturing the nuance of the model landscape of particle physics, especially since many
physicists treat the BSM model-groups as somewhat distinct from the SM (with a hope that
someday one of them will eventually supersede it). By retaining research programmes, we avoid
washing out the dynamic competition between BSM model-groups and can better capture the
details of scientific practice in this ongoing case.
So, my second, more radical modification to the MSRP is to replace the Lakatosian account
of progressiveness and degeneracy with Laudan’s problem-solving account. Laudan introduced
his methodology of problem-solving assessment independently of his research traditions, and
ostensibly it should work in any framework that includes theories (or models!) that adapt
over time to empirical and theoretical pressures. Because problem-solving effectiveness is (in
principle) determinable, even for ongoing research programmes, we avoid Hacking’s observation
that the MSRP is exclusively backwards-looking. Because Laudan’s notion of a problem admits
non-empirical solutions,24 this new hybrid framework is not exclusively empirical, which has the
added benefit of allowing a fairer assessment of the proposed solutions that cannot be tested yet.
Because a programme can see additional problems arise (as new things require explanations, or
inconsistencies are found or introduced), anomalies can be accounted for more easily than in
the original MSRP. And because the aim of the problem-solving assessment is to provide advice
for acceptance and pursuit-worthiness, the new hybrid account can definitely recommend action:
accept the research programme with the most (and most significant) solved problems, and pursue
those programmes that have demonstrated a high rate of problem-solving success recently. With
this new tool added to the MSRP, we can now apply what we have learned about the recent
histories of the CH and SUSY model-groups in Section 3, and take a preliminary look at their
progressiveness.25
4.3 (Towards) Assessing Our Case Studies
Our new tool in hand, we can see why the SM is the dominant research programme in particle
physics. Although it still has several pressing questions (some of which seem to have become
increasingly distressing after the Higgs discovery), it is also one of the most well-confirmed
theories ever produced. With such high corroboration for the solutions advanced for its empirical
problems (up to, and including, EWSB), the SM is by far the most effective problem-solver in
24This is true for both empirical and conceptual problems.
25The arguments in this section are expanded upon in (Chall, 2019).
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particle physics overall. As such, it should be (and largely is) accepted as the central particle
physics research programme. At the same time, since it is largely considered complete, there
is not much effort towards advancing the programme, and so no new solutions to its known
problems are being proposed. As a consequence, though it is accepted as the theory of particle
physics, many physicists are avidly pursuing alternatives.
As we saw in Section 3.2.1, the CH model-group faced several problems after the discovery
of a Higgs candidate. Since many existing models in this group posited either no Higgs, or a
relatively heavy Higgs, one of the first attempts to solve the problem caused by a light Higgs
was to determine if a Higgs imposter had been discovered, mostly by hunting through the data
for deviations from the SM predictions. As more data became available, all potential deviations
evaporated and physicists are more convinced than ever that we have discovered a Higgs boson.
Another possible solution appears in the form of partial compositeness, which explained the light
Higgs mass, the lack of SM deviations in the Higgs candidate’s properties, and even provided an
explanation for the mass hierarchy of the SM.26 The increased attention towards models with
partial compositeness is a sign that this solution has convinced some physicists that the model-
group remains pursuit-worthy. However, the lack of evidence for any new particles puts a hard
constraint on CH models, since all of the most accessible regions have already been explored at
the LHC. Any new models attempting to solve this problem must either provide an explanation
for why new particles haven’t been discovered by existing experiments, or raise expected energy
range for the predicted appearance of the new strong sector beyond the reach of the LHC. In
either case, the CH model-group, already winning only modest attention as a SM alternative,
has yet to put forth a solution that has convinced many physicists, leaving its problem-solving
status fairly stagnant (see Chall et al., 2019).
The SUSY model-group, on the other hand, had proposed solutions to the naturalness prob-
lem early on, and represents the addition of a significant, and expected, symmetry to particle
physics, and was therefore much more popular before the Higgs discovery. These are problems
that physicists take to be very significant, and therefore SUSY’s popularity followed from its high
degree of problem-solving promise (and therefore pursuit-worthiness). During the last few years,
it has also had to deal with a non-ideal Higgs mass and a lack of new particles. However, these
problems directly relate to SUSY’s ability to solve the naturalness and hierarchy problems, and
so the model-group’s failure to provide a compelling solution to the problems posed by the Higgs
mass has led to a different sort of strategy: considerations of naturalness, one of the features
that made simpler SUSY models attractive, are being de-emphasised in the literature. Rather
than the guiding principle of model construction it once was, some physicists are beginning to
turn away from naturalness (see, e.g., Giudice, 2017). But, for those physicists who still find
the naturalness problem a pressing issue (which remains many of them), the fact that SUSY is
looking less and less like an acceptable solution has lead to a downturn in the amount of work
being done in this research programme (see Chall et al., 2019).
5 Conclusion
Lakatosian research programmes capture the continued construction of BSM models of certain
types, even in the absence of convincing empirical evidence for any BSM phenomena, and even in
the presence of experimental evidence that is highly problematic for many specific BSM models.
Physicists are able to set aside missing and contrary data for a time, until they are either able
to explain previously damaging results (using the positive heuristic) or the programme collapses
26Dawid (2013) argues that making unexpected, unlooked for explanatory connections should raise the credence
of a theory.
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT at EUROPEAN JOURNAL FOR PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT at EUROPEAN JOURNAL FOR PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
from lack of interest, starved for new empirical content. Within my modified Lakatosian frame-
work, physicists have warrant to pursue promising research avenues and their own pragmatic
interests, without falling prey to charges of scientific irrationality. With the introduction of
model-groups, the framework of research programmes can be used to describe the current state
of the EWSB sector. This modification requires an acknowledgement that there are clusters of
models that are created using a consistent set of core ideas, constructed as potential avenues
for finding and describing new theories of physics. By updating the MSRP with modern philo-
sophical understandings of scientific models, incorporating the ‘models as mediators’ approach
from Morgan and Morrison and the classificatory scheme introduced by Hartmann, we increase
the utility of the MSRP within the realm of particle physics. With the replacement of Lakatos’s
assessment criteria with Laudan’s, we can provide the further benefit of a normative guide for
action considering the acceptance and pursuit of the ongoing BSM research programmes, based
on their problem-solving effectiveness.
As we have seen, this new hybrid framework of scientific progress suggests that, in the absence
of new corroborative experimental results, two of the BSM research programmes that have been
seen as pursuit-worthy in the last few decades seem to be losing their effectiveness. Since Laudan,
like Lakatos, suggests that competition amongst research programmes is the natural state, we can
expect the rise of research programmes championing new methods of solving the problems of the
SM.27 Of course, we should bear in mind Lakatos’s claim that there are no crucial experiments and
allow for an unexpected turn of the data (or a new experiment) that indicates one of these older
model-groups still has promise. But in the meantime, with a first pass with this hybridisation
of the MSRP, we can see reasons for advising physicists to seek new and different avenues of
research if they want to make progress in solving the problems of the SM.
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